Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Stuti Khemani
Author-Email:skhemani@worldbank.org.
Title: The Political Economy of Equalization Transfers 
Abstract: Normative theories of fiscal federalism postulate that intergovernmental transfers should be determined
 by equity and efficiency considerations, to support local governments in providing differentiated public goods
 to heterogeneous populations, while ensuring an even distribution of basic services across all regions
 (Musgrave, 1959, 1983; Oates, 1972; Gramlich, 1977). However, a recent surge of empirical evidence shows that variations
 in intergovernmental transfers to sub-national jurisdictions within countries cannot be explained by traditional concerns
 of equity and efficiency alone, and that political variables representing electoral incentives of public agents are
 additional and significant determinants.
Keywords: Political Economy,Equalization Transfers, determinants
Length: 15 pages
Creation-Date: 2004-11-01
File-URL:http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0413.pdf
File-Format:Application/PDF
Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0413