Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Wasseem Mina
Author-Email:
Author-Workplace-Name: U.A.E. University
Author-Workplace-Homepage: http://www.uaeu.ac.ae/
Author-Name: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 
Author-Email: jorgemartinez@gsu.edu 
Author-Homepage: https://icepp.gsu.edu/profile/jorge-martinez-vazquez/
Author-Workplace-Name:  International Studies Program. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
Author-Workplace-Homepage:  https://icepp.gsu.edu/
Title:  Contract Enforcement, Institutional Stability, and the Level and Maturity of International Debt 
Abstract:Contract enforcement and institutional stability play an important role in determining the level and maturity of international debt.  Contract enforcement is modeled as a fixed cost that investors incur to obtain the contracted, gross returns on international investments. Institutional stability is modeled as the probability that the same contract enforcement cost will persist over time. Countries with poor contract enforcement and institutionally unstable  impose higher contract enforcement costs and increase uncertainty about their structure. The level and maturity of international debt is reduced as a result. The empirical estimation provides support for the hypothesis. Stronger contract enforcement and institutional stability increase international lending and lengthen its maturity. 
Keywords:Contract enforcement; Institutions; Stability; International Lending; Maturity
Length: 37 pages
Creation-Date: 2006-05-01
File-URL: http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0617.pdf
File-Format:application/pdf
Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0617