Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Konstantin Pashev
Author-Workplace-Name: Governance Monitoring Association Sofia and New BUlgarian University

Author-Name: Neven Valev
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Georgia State University

Author-Name: Vanya Pasheva
Author-Workplace-Name: The World Bank

Title: Corruption in the Tax Administration: Is there Scope for Wage Incentives?


Abstract: We use unique survey data from Bulgaria’s tax administration to evaluate the determinants of corruption risk. We construct a novel measure of corruptibility, defined as the gap between actual income and the self-reported corruption-proof income. The survey data show that raising incomes leads to lower corruption risk. However, incomes would have to almost triple to eliminate the risk of corruption, which makes such a policy intervention politically and financially unfeasible. The results suggest that strengthening monitoring and control might be more cost-effective for addressing corruption risks in the case of the tax administration in Bulgaria. They also suggest that gender, age, and tenure can be used to inform human resource allocation.


Keywords: taxes, corruption, wage policy, Bulgaria

Length: 32 pages

Creation-Date: 2010-05-01

File-URL: http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp1023.pdf

File-Format:application/pdf

Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1023