

**Building Trust in State through Legal Literacy: An
RCT in the Tribal Areas & Frontier Regions of
Pakistan**

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**Building Trust in State through Legal Literacy: An RCT in
the Tribal Areas & Frontier Regions of Pakistan**

Governance Support Program
Post-Crisis Needs Assessment Programs
FATA Secretariat and Government of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa



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FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

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FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Introduction

Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas or FATA on the borders with Afghanistan are home to 4.1 million people and cover an area of more than 10 thousand square miles, slightly less than Belgium and larger than Maryland. Population lives in largely rural conurbations interspersed over hostile terrain and adheres to strong tribal affiliations. FATA have been the hotspot of militancy and violence in the last decade. During this time period, ordinary lives have been ravaged by militancy. Counter insurgency operations have been frequently conducted to restore state operations in various jurisdictions. Almost 80,000 troops from Pakistan's military have been engaged in operations in the area. Air and drone strikes carried out in these areas have been the focus of periodic attention. In an ongoing operation in a southern agency of FATA, nearly 264,000 families have become internally displaced (IDP). Similarly, large numbers have also been internally displaced from Khyber Agency .

The legal system in FATA, intertwined with civil administration, lies at the heart of governance arrangements. The procedural law, namely, Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), is a relic of the British borderland management formulated in 1901 to serve the purposes of the colonial state. The concept of citizen and citizen rights is conspicuous by omission in the Regulation. Over time the law has undergone amendments without changing the basic parameters. An oft debated component of this law is vicarious liability which is brought in by the state to impose penalties upon families and tribes in lieu of crimes committed by individuals. At the same time, individuals are held accountable before tribal juries called 'Jirgas' and courts. The courts and administrative offices are combined in the political administration. Trials are held through the system of jirgas. The community norms in this case have been adopted in part into

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

the formal justice system of FATA, ensconcing them in the regulation.¹ Over time, the credibility of the juries has deteriorated. On top of the grievance prone legal system, till 2012, the appeals system was vested in the Home Secretary and Law Secretary of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa Province. Hearing appeals against decisions by the political administration's decisions was one of the many functions of the Home Secretary leading to interminable pendency and long drawn trials. According to an estimate, an appeal could be heard for a period as long as 10 years with court days interloping between long and repeated adjournments.

Disenchantment with administration of justice has been at the core of problems and plausibly has contributed to the rise of militancy in FATA. The dissatisfaction with public services has contributed to disaffection of the people of FATA with the state (Shinwari, 2012). The ascendancy of militancy, for example, was directly linked to perceived degradation in the responsiveness of the traditional Jirga justice system (Noor, Jadoon and Asadullah, 2013). The militants have effectively exploited the perceived inadequacy and slow paced administration of justice, by presenting themselves as swift and effective arbiters of disputes. They generated this appeal by creating mechanisms for administration of rough justice which stood in stark contrast to the slow and often unpredictable course of formal justice system.

To address many accumulated grievances, the federal government in 2012 established a full time appeals tribunal. This brought in major improvements in the length of appeals and the pendency went down materially. The upstream effects of the tribunal on the functioning and regularity of the lower courts were not immediately palpable. The detailed organization of the system of justice in FATA did not undergo any major change (Wazir and Khan, 2014). The trial courts of Assistant Political Agents (APA) and the appeals courts of Commissioners remained

¹ This system lies on the continuum of informal and formal justice systems as discussed in Wojkowska, E. (2006).

part time courts, where legal matters are left competing for time with the administrative side of the political administration.

This evaluation was planned to ascertain the citizen perceptions and trust in FATA's administrative and legal institutions. It was designed and implemented as a legal literacy intervention in a randomized controlled trial. The key evaluation question was to what extent legal literacy can influence citizen perceptions and trust in the legal system of FATA and will it affect the uptake of opportunity for accessing justice created by FATA Tribunal.

The Low Functionality of the Legal System in FATA

FATA is a region in north-western Pakistan that comprises of seven Agencies and six Frontier Regions administered through a special law known as the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 (FCR). An earlier version of the law was promulgated in 1872 to provide the colonial state with an instrument to oust the jurisdiction of the judiciary in its management (Hopkins, 2015). The FCR was designed as a legal instrument with limited role of the state in tribal affairs and to protect the interest of the state in securing the borderlands. It provided mechanisms to indirectly administer these strategic areas in the interest of the colonial power (White, 2008). The state shared coercion with local elites and incorporated them as instruments of governance (Naseemullah, 2014). As a consequence, only few services were provided (Khan, 2014) and the system of administration was created on the basis of a less costly vicarious liability of families and tribes for individual liabilities. Only a limited set of issues are justiciable when they meet the threshold conditions. In the Constitution of Pakistan of 1962, higher judiciary had jurisdiction over these tribal areas. This would mean that the fundamental rights to due process of law were justiciable. A constitutional amendment brought in Article 223 (5) in 2011 extinguished the

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

jurisdiction of higher judiciary in the tribal areas. The justice system in FATA comprises of trial courts that are constituted of administrative officials with the judicial functions as additional responsibilities. At the lowest level of this legal system is the court of the Assistant Political Agent (APA) who confirms the verdicts brought in by tribal jirgas. Appeals from these decisions lie with the Commissioner who is another administrative civil servant, in this case part of the neighboring province's administration.

In order to provide a second appeal and review jurisdiction, a FATA tribunal was originally introduced through an amendments inserted in the FCR in 1997. This earlier tribunal was not a full time court but it was a contraption which empowered the Home Secretary and Law Secretary of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa Province to hold court in addition to their other administrative duties. This tribunal remained ineffective in providing legal closure to cases due to the load of administrative work on these offices of the provincial government. This was evident from the number of pending cases when this tribunal reached its sunset in February 2012.

A new fulltime appeals tribunal was enacted in 2011 and commissioned in February, 2012. The fulltime Tribunal had enhanced independence and visibility of the court. As before, the verdicts made by a political agent could be appealed to the commissioner of the adjacent settled district. Subsequently, the appeal from the commissioner's verdicts could lie to the FATA Tribunal. The appellate authority, the tribunal in this case, were empowered to review decisions, decrees, orders and sentences of the lower courts of the political agent or commissioner.

The reform legislation specified that the membership of the FATA Tribunal would consist of a chairman and two other members. The qualifications of chairman were specified to require experience as senior civil servant and with experience of working in the tribal areas. One of the two members were to have the same experience whereas the third member would have

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

qualifications in law and experience of working as a senior attorney in addition to knowledge of customary laws in vogue in the tribal areas. The new tribunal became an improvement on the earlier arrangement by providing a fulltime appellate court and its separation from the executive branch of the provincial government. This was the first ever attempt at creating an independent court for FATA.

The trial courts in FATA are encumbered by administrative duties. Another way of describing this would be that there are no fulltime courts. The justice system is embedded in the civil administration and many times security concerns and tribal administration take precedence over administration of justice to individual litigants. The higher concern with administrative priorities is manifest from a few simple facts collected during the evaluation. The most important trial court, the APA Court, are officially required to be held 3 days in a week. The actual days it is held is generally once a week. The Commissioner is to hold court for FATA appeals once a week. During data collection for this evaluation, it was found that the courts were held on average once a month. The court statistics show that on average the APA takes 400 plus days for reaching a decision. The average trial duration in a Commissioner's court is 250 days. Since 2012, the duration of trial in FATA Tribunal is 92 days. It decided 804 cases from February 20, 2012 to January 30, 2015.

Access to Justice and Legal Literacy

Legal procedures may limit or enhance access to justice. The fairness and predictability of the processes to dispute resolution have a linkage with economic development.² A comprehensive coverage of law over society individuals can create the predictability that

² For example see Bourguignon (2000) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2005).

minimizes transaction costs. Fair and equitable process of dispute resolution are an integral component of systems that support property rights and economic activity both critical to post-conflict stabilization. The formal legal procedures may not have the capacity to provide resolution to low-income litigants which would be the majority of those involved in legal proceedings (Rubinson, 2005). Therefore, there has been a strong argument for reform of judicial process as an essential component of development with a focus on empowering the poor and powerless and promote fairness and equity, moving beyond reform of legal procedures (Armytage, 2012). The emphasis on legal literacy brought in by GSP in addition to procedural reform resonates with this approach.

Access to justice focusing on systems alone is a limiting concept especially in post-conflict environments (Samuels, 1998). It assumes a high level of legal literacy in the citizens or its strengthening through provision of legal advice. Without proactive measures at empowering the citizen, his or her engagement with the justice system may not guarantee access to justice. Identification and addressing legal needs is a suitable strategy for empowering the poor and enabling them in accessing justice in the formal justice system.³ In case of FATA, legal advice is not guaranteed and in lower courts attorneys are not required. The legal rights to counsel are restricted in the system.⁴ The legal process allows the litigants to represent themselves before the tribal jirgas and later before courts in case of appeals. Before the tribunal, lawyers are allowed to represent litigants. The Jirga built on social customs rather than formality of a procedural code has the potential to deliver justice at low costs to litigants. However, without access to resources, including legal literacy, the flexibility of the Jirga system may not lead to fair outcomes for the

³ Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (2008); p. 14.

⁴ Similar to the description in Rhode (2003).

litigants. Without access to organizational and social resources, mostly disrupted by conflict in this case, the interests of the weak litigants may not be guaranteed.⁵

In addition to independent and competent courts, access to justice is predicated on legal literacy. We define legal literacy as knowledge of rights, procedures and options in a legal system that enable an individual to access justice. Without legal literacy, ordinary citizens may not be able to benefit much from the justice system. Legal literacy would be a constituent of integrated development without which a comprehensive development approach would not be possible.⁶ Citizens without legal literacy may become embroiled in the procedure and suffer due to its abuse. Navigation through procedure by timely decisions and accessing legal advice may not be automatically guaranteed for citizens with low legal literacy resulting in delays in achieving the rightful outcomes through the process of law. Without regard to the type of the justice system, long pendency for dispute resolution leading to inordinate delay is commonly deemed a form of miscarriage of justice.⁷ Delaying procedures and costs are seen as attributes of quality of justice system in addition to how the system treats citizens (Tyler, 2001). A system of justice prone to delays and abuse of process increases the probability of such outcomes for citizens without optimal legal literacy. It may lead to miscarriage of justice and denial of rights to litigants in addition to high costs of prolonged litigation.

Legal literacy is an enabling device which allows the citizens engage with the state in a productive manner and seek outcomes possible through the process of law. It allows a citizen to identify various options available during a trial and how best to access them. It lowers their helplessness in an otherwise impersonalized system where the coercive power of the state is

⁵ cf. Gauri (2009).

⁶ As for example argued for women empowerment in Sen (2006), p.47.

⁷ cf. Manarin (2009); Chase (2012); Balko (2013); Rao (2013); and Legg (2014).

paramount. Absence of knowledge of skills increases litigants dependency on others and may also lead to disaffection. Legal literacy empowers marginalized sections society.⁸ The inability to exercise rights is one of the factors that contributes to perpetuation of poverty (Banik, 2009). Inability to process legal information and mistrust of procedures ousts the poor from accessing justice through legal procedure (Anderson, 1999). The absence of legal literacy becomes a barrier to seeking justice through the formal justice system.

In post conflict environments while the capacity of the state to deliver justice may be constrained, investment in services provided to the users of the system may provide higher dividends (Baker and Scheye, 2007). In fact the option of investing in formal procedures and courts alone may not achieve the policy objectives of restoration of citizen trust in the formal institutions of the state. Without investment in legal literacy and legal resources available to the citizen, sophisticated law and courts alone may lead a second best theory outcome.⁹ Complex laws and trained judges in the absence of legal resources available to the citizen may only prolong trials or increase costs of litigation. Legal literacy should be not only part of the comprehensive governance reforms but also included if a minimal agenda is to be pursued.¹⁰

Legal reform carried out as part of peace building should include an emphasis on citizen rights and capacities. The quality of the processes as viewed by the litigants and citizens is an important component of access to justice. Only procedures seen as fair are deemed to be enhancing access to justice (Klaming and Giesen, 2008). Building such perceptions would be a legitimate objective of reforms in the justice system. Different factors could contribute to citizen

⁸ See for example Chesley (1993); Macaulay (2002); Grimes (2003) and Cotula, and Mathieu (2008).

⁹ This is an application of the conceptual devise used in describing the third constraint on judicial reform in Stephenson (2007).

¹⁰ cf. Grindle (2004).

perceptions of justice system. Changing these factors could result in change in perceptions. Delays, procedural abuse and disempowerment could be some of these factors and reforms dealing with them or empowering the citizen to deal with them could lead to change in perceptions. In addition, systemic corruption could lower confidence in courts and other components of the criminal justice system (Seligson, 2002). Knowledge and skills to deal with procedural constraints will empower the litigants to engage with the justice system with less trepidation and higher level of engagement. Legal literacy from this perspective of enabling citizens could also lead to change in perceptions.

Low confidence of citizens in the justice system should be recognized as call for procedural reform (Sherman, 2002). This should be recognized on the back of one of the fundamental functions of the state. In our evaluation, we elicit litigant responses to this aspect of the legal procedures in FATA. We also test the efficacy of legal literacy in changing perceptions and levels of trust in state institutions.

Evaluation Questions and Approach

For the evaluation study, three evaluation questions were set out by GSP. These are:

1. What is the impact of legal literacy on litigant perceptions and how can it contribute to reinstate effectiveness of the state and gain citizen's trust?
2. What is the impact of operationalizing FATA Tribunal or right to appeal against APA or Commissioner's decisions on reinstating effectiveness of the state and gaining citizen's trust?
3. What is the effect of FATA Tribunal on improving governance?

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

A randomized controlled trial was designed to carry out evaluation. A sample of trial and appellate courts was drawn from the list of courts in FATA. To this sample, the Tribunal was added as one of its kind appellate court. The litigants are given adjournments over time as their cases travel through the legal system. A time period of November 1, 2014 to January 30, 2015 comprising of 3 calendar months and all court days falling in them was designated for subject enrollment. Subject enrollment was followed by administration of baseline perception survey. The subjects were later randomly assigned to treatment and control groups of equivalent sizes.

A legal literacy message was drawn up to provide information on citizen rights in the legal procedure, provision for appeals and what could be done to seek justice in the legal system of FATA. The messages were sent to all litigants placed in the treatment group. The litigants in the control group did not receive any legal literacy message.

A final survey was administered to elicit litigant responses to quality of services, court proceedings, and confidence in formal institutions of the justice system.

Legal Literacy Intervention and Data Collection

A random sample of trial and appellate courts was selected for data collection. Subject enrollment was carried out by GSP from November 1, 2014 to January 30, 2015. For this purpose, GSP placed enumerators at each of the sample courts on each court day. During enrollment, the contact details of the litigants was obtained. A baseline litigant perception was carried out after enrollment. As a result, 322 litigants were enrolled with cases under trial and 61 litigants were enrolled with decided cases. During the enrollment process, perceptions of the all 383 litigants were also recorded on a specially designed questionnaire. The litigant responses

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

were recorded by the enumerators hired and placed by ISU directly in the courts. During data collection, a number of issues were encountered. The APAs and Commissioner court did not take place on most of the court days and cases were adjourned without coming up before the court. Due to this reason a rolling enrollment plan was carried out over 3 months.

Out of 382 litigants, 276 litigants provided their contact details. Thus, the list of 276 litigants' was randomized into control and treatment groups. The enumerators were not involved in the random assignment process to rule out any potential investigator bias. After randomization of litigants in to control and treatment group, data validation was performed by ISU M&E Staff. From control group, a random sample of 50 litigants numbers was randomly selected. Out of these, 30 litigants attended the call and all confirmed the name of their respected enumerator and were satisfied with the perception noting process.

The subject enrollment was followed by legal literacy messaging using cellphones. This was carried out from February 16 to March 5, 2015. The contents of the messages included information on the amendments made in the FCR:

1. The arrested party, to be presented to the authorities within 24 hours.
2. Under communal punishment women, children under 16 and elders above 65 would not be arrested.
3. An arrested party can get bail during trial.
4. Any of the parties not satisfied with judgment of the APA or Commissioner, have the right to appeal in FATA Tribunal.

The final survey was from April 10 to May 4, 2015. There was a sample attrition and the final survey was administered to only 192 litigants.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

The surveys encountered several issues. Litigant enrollment took longer than anticipated as the staff in the courts were not supportive. In many cases, court days were not held. Litigants were not willing to share phone numbers due to the prevailing security situation and related suspicions. During the final survey, many phone numbers were blocked due to delayed biometric verification that was commissioned by government all over the country.

Descriptive Statistics

There are 19 APA's courts, 6 Commissioners courts and the FATA Tribunal. Out of the 26 courts, the following courts were not accessible due to military operations:

1. APA Miranshah, NWA
2. APA Razmak, NWA
3. APA Mirali, NWA
4. APA Upper, Orakzai Agency

For FATA Judicial System, Impact Evaluation following 13 Courts were randomly selected:

1. APA Jamrud Khyber Agency
2. APA Bara Khyber Agency
3. APA Nawagai Bajaur Agency
4. APA Yakkaghund Mohmand Agency
5. APA Lower Kurram Agency
6. Commissioner Peshawar
7. Commissioner Kohat
8. Commissioner Bannu
9. Commissioner DI Khan
10. FR Kohat
11. FR Bannu
12. FR D I Khan
13. FATA Tribunal

Figure 1 shows that the respondents favored community based organizations as a solution to their problems. The relative support for formal for FATA administration (provincial government officials) was lower but next in importance. In this subgroup of population where they were selected because of their status of being litigants in FATA courts, the satisfaction level

with the services provided by the political administration was high as 33 percent expressed that they were highly satisfied (Figure 2). The fractions that were not satisfied were much lower. These inquiries were further broken down into three types of roles for the political administration, namely development, security and provision of justice. The respondents deemed that the role of the political administration was essential in development and provision of justice (Figure 3) compared with that in security. This is in line with the current situation where the political administration has been largely involved in development and administration of justice and less so in provision of security in the last decade.

The perceptions on investments in schools and healthcare were elicited from the respondents. Majority of the respondents had positive perceptions that investments had been made in schools and healthcare in the last one year; a comparatively higher ranking was for healthcare facilities. These results are shown in Figure 4. Similarly positive perceptions predominate in administration of justice improvements in the last one year. Figure 5 shows that a large majority of 73 percent respondents have positive perceptions that the FATA Administration has taken steps to improve the system of justice in the last one year. Out of the total 67 percent perceive that FATA Tribunal has improved the legal system in the tribal areas. Both of these findings are important to note as they are coming from the direct users of the legal systems.

The respondents were asked to rank the investments in infrastructure over the past one year. These were separated as investments by the federal government and by FATA Administration. In reality, the federal government and FATA Administration may not be readily distinguishable as the latter is an administrative extension of the former. The question about federal investments was for large infrastructure while the one relating to FATA Administration was for local infrastructure. The replies would therefore be more in tune with the type of

infrastructure. The respondent perceptions on these counts are summarized in Figure 6. A large majority of 76 percent had positive perceptions of investments in large scale infrastructure; similarly 72 percent respondents had positive perceptions of FATA Administration's investments in local infrastructure.

In the last one year, action against militancy and resulting IDP crisis have been major issues for government in the tribal areas. Rehabilitation of IDPs has remained high on the government's list of priority activities. Figure 7 summarizes perceptions on federal government, FATA administration and agency level political administration's work on controlling militancy and rehabilitating IDPs. A majority of the response were positive except on the score of controlling militancy. In this case a little less than half the responses are positive.

Perception of public services respond to changes in level and quality of services. These can lead to change in trust in state institutions as well. The survey results explore the levels of trust in state institutions. Figure 8 shows that overall trust in the political administration is low with 71 percent reporting low confidence. It should be noted that this survey represents litigants and not the general population of FATA. Similarly, 79 percent of the litigants expressed that they have low confidence in the first level courts of Assistant Political Agents. This low confidence carries on to the court of PA in the agency. As reported in Figure 10, a total of 74 percent litigants express low confidence in the court of PA. The litigants report a slightly better level of trust in the courts of appeal, Courts of the Commissioners. Only 62 percent express low confidence in these courts. The distribution of responses is also varied in this case. A large number of litigants are in the middle range where they are not very confident but also not very suspicious of these courts (Figure 11).

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Compared with these low confidence in the lower courts and court of first appeal, the situation is better when it comes to FATA Tribunal. For this court of appeals, the litigants have a higher confidence as a little more than half of the respondents expressed confidence in this court. As shown in Figure 12, the very high confidence even in the Tribunal is not held by a high percentage of the litigants with only 18 percent litigants expressing high confidence through strong agreement. On the other end of the scale, 20 percent held strongly that they had no confidence in the Tribunal.

We also inquired about confidence in informal institutions. Figure 13 shows that a high 86 percent of the litigants expressed confidence in the mosque as an institution. Compared with this those expressing very low confidence in the mosque were 4 percent. The inquiries in other institutions were pursued with the litigants. This shows that low confidence in formal institutions pushes up confidence in informal institutions.

Results

We estimated a model to test the effectiveness of the legal literacy intervention on various dimension of trust in institutions. The summary of key results are reported in Tables S1 to S3 with the coefficients on the treatment variable reflected in these tables. The detailed results are shown in the Tables 1 to 15.

Table S1 has the results from the OLS regressions and Probit regressions. In column 1 and 2, the results are shown for different specification with and without controls in the estimation equation. The results are significant for the treatment variable. It shows that the legal literacy intervention had a positive effect on perceptions of the Tribunal and judicial system but it did not have any effect on the litigants' satisfaction with court proceedings. In column 3 and 4, we report

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

results for the probit specification with the dependent variable as satisfaction with the judicial system in FATA. The coefficient on the treatment variables is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level for Satisfied with court proceedings; Satisfied with Judicial System in FATA; Are you satisfied with trial courts of APAs in FATA; and Have you views about the legal system in FATA changed in the last 3 months. There was no effect on the perceptions of adjournments and length of time between them given by the court; expectation of justice from the legal system. There were not effects on how satisfied the litigants with their life as a whole nor on satisfaction with judicial system in FATA. The results are robust to changes in the specification and addition of controls. It indicates that the legal literacy interventions produced a positive effect on satisfaction with important dimensions of the judicial system in FATA. In all the specifications there is a positive change in views in the last 3 months matching with the duration of the legal literacy intervention. The coefficient on the treatment is positive and statistically significant at 1 percent levels for key variables like satisfaction with the judicial system and with court proceedings. The results is robust to changes in specifications. When we report results for satisfaction with services provided by the political administration, it includes administration of the legal system being one of the important services. Here the results are not very sanguine with only a slight positive change shown indicating that the upstream effects of the FATA Tribunal at this stage are weak.

The models were estimated as multinomial logits as well and results are given in Table S2 and Table 13. The results do not change materially from the OLS regressions and probit specifications. The show that the improvements, sometimes shown as negative changes in worsening of perceptions, are significant for the treated group. Again the results are robust to

addition of controls. The estimations do not find any effect of the treatment on satisfaction with the court proceedings and satisfaction with the trial courts of APAs.

In Table 1 to 12 we report the detailed results of the OLS, probit and logit models. The magnitudes of the change in perceptions in various dimensions of perceptions of judicial process and system are considerable. In a specially exposed group to the justice system where the perceptions are likely to be acute, this result is important as it indicates the potential of legal literacy interventions on citizen perceptions. The magnitude of the change in perceptions are a result of exposure to the legal literacy treatment shows that the perceptions regarding the legal system in FATA changed materially for those exposed to treatment. It indicates in Table 2 that those exposed to the treatment of legal literacy are 22 to 23 percent more likely to report a positive change in perceptions about the legal system in FATA compared with those not exposed to treatment.

Conclusions

Legal system in FATA has been in the crosshairs of policy discussions since 2010. Many perceive this to have contributed to rise in militancy. It therefore remains a major area of focus in post-crisis strategies for peacebuilding and development. On the political horizon, there have been longstanding demands for reform of the justice system of FATA. In this regard, FATA Tribunal was an important reform measure which created a full time court of appeals. At the same time, GSP carried out a legal literacy intervention to directly engage with the litigants and provide them information on their rights in the legal system. The legal literacy intervention also provided information about the litigants' rights in courts, the provisions of appeals and how procedures can be availed to access justice in the system. The intervention made by GSP was a

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

significant step in empowering the litigants in navigating an otherwise slow moving system and oft perceived as capricious system.

This study measures the impact of the legal literacy intervention from the state on those who are either under coercive power of the state or are attempting to get access to the power to get resolution to their disputes. Both categories are included since both criminal and civil litigations cases were included in the sample.

From the survey results, a low confidence in the lower courts of FATA is manifest. During the survey, it was found that the lower courts were often not being held on account of presiding officers being pulled toward administrative duties. This could be contributing to the low confidence litigants express in the lower courts.

The general levels of confidence in the courts is very low. On top of this, perceptions about FATA Tribunal are positive. The legal literacy provided information about appeals process and rights of the citizens in the legal procedure of FATA. The positive effect of the legal literacy on trust in the legal system shows that knowledge of rights moves the confidence from its low level. It is possible that this takes place through a feeling of empowerment in dealing with the procedures and justice system which otherwise is viewed with low confidence.

The results signify that legal literacy could help generate positive perceptions of the legal system. These perceptions may contribute to higher engagement with the formal legal system. If this is combined with improvements in the procedures and efficiency of the legal process, this could lead to effective engagement of citizens and state in FATA. The rampant low confidence and its sensitivity to legal literacy shows that the low confidence in justice system could be arising from lack of understanding or perceptions of neglect. The negative perceptions could be

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

emanating from the lackadaisical manner in which the administrative office manage courts. Most of this could be fixed in the short run.

The reform of the legal system has been seeking new procedures. This are a necessary condition. But will they be sufficient to induce citizen trust back in the state in FATA? This question is worth considering. It is straightforward induction from citizen rights that legal literacy should be an integral component of an overall governance reform. At the same time, it should be noted that legal literacy should be part of even a minimal governance program.

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Figure 1. In your opinion, which of the following entities would best improve service delivery in your agency?




Figure 2. I am satisfied with the quality of the services provided by the political administration.




Figure 5. The role of The Office of the Political Agent.




Figure 4. Improvements by FATA Administration investments.




Figure 5. Role of Government in System of Justice.




Figure 6. Role of the Government in Regional and Local Infrastructure.




Figure 7. Role of the Government in Rehabilitation of IDPs and Control of Militancy in the region.

The extra panel to be dropped




Figure 8. Confidence in The Political Administration.




Figure 9. Confidence in the Courts of APA.




Figure 10. Confidence in the Court of PA




Figure 11. Confidence in the Court of Commissioner.




Figure 12. Confidence in the FATA Tribunal.





Figure 13. Confidence in The Mosque (Any religious institution you belong too).



FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table S1. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal effects of Treatment.

	Treatment effect					
	OLS	OLS	Probit	Marginal Effect	Probit	Marginal Effect
	Without controls	With controls	Without controls		With controls	
Dependent variables						
Satisfied with court proceedings (1 if Satisfied)	0.0935	0.0847	0.252	0.0938	0.235	0.0858
Satisfied with Judicial System in FATA (1 if Satisfied).	0.219***	0.219***	0.636***	0.224***	0.678***	0.228***
Are you satisfied with trial courts of APAs in FATA (1 if Satisfied)	0.134**	0.113*	0.440**	0.135**	0.378*	0.109*
Have you views about the legal system in FATA changed in the last 3 months? (1 if Yes)	0.249***	0.260***	0.651***	0.254***	0.774***	0.298***
I am satisfied with the quality of the services provided by the political administration (1 if Agree)	0.109*	0.129*	0.322*	0.110*	0.440**	0.141**
Satisfaction with cost of litigation that is high (1 if Satisfied)	0.0912	0.0687	0.284	0.0917	0.237	0.0738
Satisfaction with lawyers' help with me (1 if Satisfied)	0.184***	0.230***	0.495***	0.186***	0.669***	0.247***
Satisfaction with adjournments and length of time between them given by the court (1 if Satisfied)	0.111	0.0995	0.288	0.111	0.313	0.116
Satisfaction with expectation of justice from the legal system (1 if Satisfied)	0.0657	0.0533	0.184	0.0659	0.178	0.0556
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (1 if Satisfied)	-0.0601	-0.0595	-0.184	-0.0603	-0.17	-0.0535
Change in satisfaction with judicial system in FATA (1 if improved)	0.113	0.0939	0.302	0.114	0.276	0.0998
Change in satisfaction with judicial system in FATA (1 if worsened)	-0.183***	-0.173***	-0.609***	-0.182***	-0.593***	-0.168***

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

*indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

Table S2. Estimated OLS, Multinomial Probit and Logit coefficients of treatment.

Dependent variable: Change in satisfaction with judicial system in FATA (0 or No Change is the base).

OLS		Multinomial Probit				Multinomial Logit			
		Improved	Worsened	Improved	Worsened	Improved	Worsened	Improved	Worsened
Without controls	With controls	Without controls		With controls		Without controls		With controls	
-0.252**	-0.251**	0.106	-0.731**	0.0608	-0.721**	0.136	-0.984**	0.131	-1.016**

*indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 1. Estimated OLS coefficients.

Table 1. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Satisfied with court proceedings (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	Probit	Marginal Effect	Probit	Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.0935 (0.0684)	0.0847 (0.0732)	0.252 (0.185)	0.0938 (0.0689)	0.235 (0.202)	0.0858 (0.0738)
Duration of trial (days)		-7.54e-05** (2.90e-05)			-0.000427 (0.000302)	-0.000156 (0.000109)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		0.103 (0.156)			0.204 (0.444)	0.0701 (0.147)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		0.0933 (0.154)			0.175 (0.438)	0.0597 (0.144)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		0.103 (0.161)			0.204 (0.459)	0.0699 (0.153)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.174 (0.188)			0.417 (0.515)	0.150 (0.180)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.311 (0.246)			0.857 (0.654)	0.324 (0.239)
Years of Education		0.00614 (0.00753)			0.0143 (0.0207)	0.00522 (0.00754)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0914 (0.174)			0.290 (0.452)	0.106 (0.169)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.0254 (0.119)			-0.0302 (0.355)	-0.0103 (0.121)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.0686 (0.121)			0.197 (0.356)	0.0712 (0.129)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.0538 (0.0983)			0.175 (0.288)	0.0628 (0.102)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.110 (0.172)			-0.312 (0.429)	-0.114 (0.157)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.199*** (0.0736)			0.590*** (0.214)	0.216*** (0.0784)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0761 (0.0849)			0.250 (0.257)	0.0913 (0.0941)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.00974 (0.00757)			-0.0278 (0.0230)	-0.0101 (0.00843)
Constant	0.309*** (0.0479)	0.121 (0.231)	-0.500*** (0.136)		-0.971 (0.634)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.009	0.093				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 2. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Satisfied with Judicial System in FATA (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) Marginal Effect	(5) Probit	(6) Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.219*** (0.0644)	0.219*** (0.0683)	0.636*** (0.193)	0.224*** (0.0676)	0.678*** (0.212)	0.228*** (0.0707)
Duration of trial (days)		-1.72e-05 (4.12e-05)			-6.40e-05 (0.000182)	-2.15e-05 (6.09e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		0.203* (0.121)			0.660 (0.426)	0.207* (0.118)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		0.139 (0.124)			0.485 (0.427)	0.144 (0.113)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		0.0287 (0.130)			0.0829 (0.456)	0.0207 (0.112)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.213 (0.152)			0.678 (0.495)	0.214 (0.148)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.140 (0.205)			0.502 (0.654)	0.149 (0.207)
Years of Education		-0.00225 (0.00723)			-0.00775 (0.0215)	-0.00261 (0.00724)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0513 (0.160)			0.120 (0.447)	0.0442 (0.166)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0563 (0.121)			0.187 (0.358)	0.0696 (0.133)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.00960 (0.122)			0.0285 (0.372)	0.0103 (0.134)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		-0.112 (0.0935)			-0.353 (0.296)	-0.114 (0.1000)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.349** (0.158)			-1.019** (0.421)	-0.343** (0.142)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.106 (0.0700)			0.334 (0.215)	0.112 (0.0726)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0462 (0.0848)			0.112 (0.276)	0.0375 (0.0929)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0157** (0.00643)			-0.0530** (0.0226)	-0.0178** (0.00762)
Constant	0.202*** (0.0416)	0.431** (0.205)	-0.834*** (0.147)		-0.221 (0.618)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.056	0.140				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 3. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Are you satisfied with trial courts of APAs in FATA (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) Marginal Effect	(5) Probit	(6) Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.134** (0.0601)	0.113* (0.0647)	0.440** (0.201)	0.135** (0.0614)	0.378* (0.215)	0.109* (0.0614)
Duration of trial (days)		-3.13e-05 (4.00e-05)			-0.000130 (0.000203)	-3.73e-05 (5.82e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		0.166* (0.0924)			0.756 (0.521)	0.165* (0.0901)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		0.113 (0.0926)			0.557 (0.533)	0.109 (0.0849)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		0.139 (0.103)			0.660 (0.542)	0.137 (0.0935)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.242* (0.125)			0.994* (0.554)	0.244** (0.119)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.385* (0.208)			1.431** (0.708)	0.412* (0.212)
Years of Education		-0.000707 (0.00670)			-0.00248 (0.0216)	-0.000713 (0.00620)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.0264 (0.135)			-0.101 (0.471)	-0.0279 (0.128)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.0185 (0.102)			-0.0672 (0.381)	-0.0189 (0.107)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.0129 (0.111)			0.0230 (0.388)	0.00671 (0.113)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.00182 (0.0843)			0.0241 (0.302)	0.00703 (0.0876)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.0731 (0.155)			-0.266 (0.463)	-0.0765 (0.133)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.103 (0.0667)			0.353 (0.227)	0.102 (0.0652)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0529 (0.0819)			0.215 (0.301)	0.0619 (0.0868)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.00319 (0.00680)			-0.0127 (0.0232)	-0.00366 (0.00671)
Constant	0.170*** (0.0390)	0.0154 (0.181)	-0.953*** (0.153)		-1.686** (0.718)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.024	0.066				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 4. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Have you views about the legal system in FATA changed in the last 3 months? (1 if Yes).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) Marginal Effect	(5) Probit	(6) Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.249*** (0.0686)	0.260*** (0.0708)	0.651*** (0.186)	0.254*** (0.0724)	0.774*** (0.213)	0.298*** (0.0820)
Duration of trial (days)		2.20e-05 (4.58e-05)			6.33e-05 (0.000121)	2.44e-05 (4.67e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		0.131 (0.139)			0.348 (0.418)	0.117 (0.134)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		0.216 (0.134)			0.655* (0.396)	0.235* (0.127)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		0.163 (0.150)			0.479 (0.429)	0.166 (0.141)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.303* (0.172)			0.897* (0.491)	0.331** (0.169)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.119 (0.193)			0.257 (0.622)	0.0842 (0.209)
Years of Education		0.0116* (0.00666)			0.0401* (0.0205)	0.0155* (0.00793)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.00209 (0.172)			-0.0387 (0.467)	-0.0154 (0.186)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.00960 (0.133)			-0.01000 (0.362)	-0.00399 (0.144)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		-0.0822 (0.109)			-0.337 (0.355)	-0.132 (0.137)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		-0.135 (0.0912)			-0.455 (0.285)	-0.175 (0.110)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.487*** (0.145)			-1.510*** (0.530)	-0.582*** (0.206)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.247*** (0.0720)			0.756*** (0.225)	0.291*** (0.0865)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0218 (0.0972)			0.0139 (0.286)	0.00537 (0.110)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.00857 (0.00866)			-0.0221 (0.0260)	-0.00852 (0.0100)
Constant	0.290*** (0.0473)	0.419* (0.224)	-0.552*** (0.138)		-0.174 (0.670)	
Observations	195	189	195	195	189	189
R-squared	0.063	0.214				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 5. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: I am satisfied with the quality of the services provided by the political administration (1 if Agree).

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	Probit	Marginal Effect	Probit	Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.109*	0.129*	0.322*	0.110*	0.440**	0.141**
	(0.0645)	(0.0665)	(0.192)	(0.0654)	(0.212)	(0.0681)
Duration of trial (days)		-7.68e-06			-3.36e-05	-1.08e-05
		(3.70e-05)			(0.000146)	(4.67e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		0.0915			0.244	0.0792
		(0.136)			(0.424)	(0.132)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		0.0983			0.272	0.0891
		(0.139)			(0.418)	(0.130)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		-0.128			-0.586	-0.134
		(0.137)			(0.451)	(0.118)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.260			0.772	0.281*
		(0.170)			(0.491)	(0.168)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.0561			0.0647	0.0198
		(0.213)			(0.664)	(0.204)
Years of Education		-0.00310			-0.0108	-0.00346
		(0.00710)			(0.0227)	(0.00730)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.0743			-0.244	-0.0883
		(0.180)			(0.495)	(0.174)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.0729			-0.253	-0.0911
		(0.122)			(0.372)	(0.133)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		-0.0832			-0.229	-0.0829
		(0.129)			(0.388)	(0.139)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		-0.167*			-0.573*	-0.189*
		(0.0967)			(0.302)	(0.106)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.268			-0.906**	-0.290**
		(0.162)			(0.435)	(0.140)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		-0.0180			-0.0527	-0.0169
		(0.0728)			(0.223)	(0.0713)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.171**			0.672**	0.215**
		(0.0702)			(0.304)	(0.0987)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0206***			-0.0746***	-0.0239***
		(0.00712)			(0.0271)	(0.00862)
Constant	0.234***	0.534***	-0.726***		0.176	
	(0.0439)	(0.205)	(0.143)		(0.637)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.014	0.157				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 6. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Satisfaction with cost of litigation that is high (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	Probit	Marginal Effect	Probit	Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.0912 (0.0624)	0.0687 (0.0660)	0.284 (0.196)	0.0917 (0.0631)	0.237 (0.208)	0.0738 (0.0647)
Duration of trial (days)		-2.46e-05 (2.85e-05)			-9.92e-05 (0.000125)	-3.09e-05 (3.90e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0811 (0.152)			-0.245 (0.415)	-0.0865 (0.150)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		-0.152 (0.144)			-0.493 (0.409)	-0.162 (0.144)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0665 (0.154)			-0.218 (0.418)	-0.0773 (0.152)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		-0.161 (0.170)			-0.529 (0.492)	-0.171 (0.162)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		-0.193 (0.223)			-0.585 (0.751)	-0.186 (0.215)
Years of Education		-0.00915 (0.00741)			-0.0295 (0.0216)	-0.00919 (0.00672)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0698 (0.157)			0.233 (0.460)	0.0742 (0.151)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0473 (0.115)			0.174 (0.356)	0.0543 (0.111)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		-0.0565 (0.105)			-0.202 (0.396)	-0.0543 (0.104)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.0405 (0.0975)			0.150 (0.300)	0.0465 (0.0910)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		0.0416 (0.176)			0.0862 (0.481)	0.0268 (0.150)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.0927 (0.0697)			0.328 (0.221)	0.102 (0.0689)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0440 (0.0861)			0.176 (0.284)	0.0549 (0.0885)
How long should a case take (months)		0.000618 (0.00735)			0.000644 (0.0234)	0.000201 (0.00727)
Constant	0.213*** (0.0424)	0.239 (0.212)	-0.797*** (0.146)		-0.756 (0.627)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.011	0.049				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 7. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Satisfaction with lawyers' help with me (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) Marginal Effect	(5) Probit	(6) Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.184*** (0.0679)	0.230*** (0.0711)	0.495*** (0.186)	0.186*** (0.0701)	0.669*** (0.211)	0.247*** (0.0777)
Duration of trial (days)		-1.45e-05 (3.78e-05)			-5.50e-05 (0.000149)	-2.03e-05 (5.50e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0807 (0.156)			-0.270 (0.405)	-0.104 (0.158)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0759 (0.155)			-0.234 (0.402)	-0.0908 (0.158)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		-0.239 (0.156)			-0.731* (0.425)	-0.257* (0.156)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.00651 (0.182)			-0.00815 (0.473)	-0.00323 (0.188)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.0951 (0.222)			0.294 (0.587)	0.117 (0.231)
Years of Education		0.00904 (0.00723)			0.0242 (0.0213)	0.00895 (0.00785)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.0576 (0.175)			-0.0911 (0.473)	-0.0315 (0.161)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.0218 (0.119)			-0.0352 (0.354)	-0.0124 (0.124)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.0965 (0.114)			0.292 (0.365)	0.109 (0.138)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.0430 (0.0955)			0.158 (0.287)	0.0579 (0.104)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.205 (0.154)			-0.582 (0.407)	-0.215 (0.150)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.221*** (0.0749)			0.650*** (0.228)	0.240*** (0.0834)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0128 (0.0830)			0.0399 (0.255)	0.0147 (0.0944)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0154** (0.00737)			-0.0469** (0.0233)	-0.0173** (0.00861)
Constant	0.277*** (0.0464)	0.378* (0.214)	-0.593*** (0.138)		-0.354 (0.586)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.036	0.153				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 8. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Satisfaction with adjournments and length of time between them given by the court (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	Probit	Marginal Effect	Probit	Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.111 (0.0698)	0.0995 (0.0702)	0.288 (0.183)	0.111 (0.0705)	0.313 (0.200)	0.116 (0.0744)
Duration of trial (days)		-8.20e-05** (3.32e-05)			-0.000802* (0.000418)	-0.000297** (0.000151)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0748 (0.154)			-0.350 (0.426)	-0.135 (0.166)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		-0.113 (0.150)			-0.443 (0.413)	-0.168 (0.160)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		-0.159 (0.157)			-0.598 (0.434)	-0.219 (0.164)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.217 (0.173)			0.600 (0.507)	0.231 (0.191)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0442 (0.222)			-0.314 (0.694)	-0.121 (0.262)
Years of Education		-0.00287 (0.00764)			-0.0134 (0.0207)	-0.00496 (0.00768)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0685 (0.168)			0.269 (0.468)	0.0980 (0.174)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.109 (0.120)			0.359 (0.347)	0.133 (0.128)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.0272 (0.122)			0.0832 (0.365)	0.0291 (0.128)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.0535 (0.101)			0.195 (0.293)	0.0701 (0.103)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.202 (0.166)			-0.541 (0.427)	-0.201 (0.158)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.0507 (0.0738)			0.136 (0.212)	0.0506 (0.0789)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0216 (0.0877)			0.0793 (0.275)	0.0294 (0.102)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0253*** (0.00778)			-0.0751*** (0.0275)	-0.0279*** (0.0101)
Constant	0.340*** (0.0491)	0.682*** (0.216)	-0.411*** (0.134)		0.756 (0.623)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.013	0.153				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 9. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Satisfaction with expectation of justice from the legal system (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) Marginal Effect	(5) Probit	(6) Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.0657 (0.0668)	0.0533 (0.0687)	0.184 (0.188)	0.0659 (0.0671)	0.178 (0.207)	0.0556 (0.0645)
Duration of trial (days)		-8.61e-05** (3.33e-05)			-0.00153*** (0.000535)	-0.000477*** (0.000146)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		-0.111 (0.152)			-0.485 (0.461)	-0.155 (0.156)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0724 (0.150)			-0.380 (0.441)	-0.126 (0.154)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0199 (0.155)			-0.244 (0.449)	-0.0844 (0.159)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.127 (0.181)			0.296 (0.508)	0.114 (0.192)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0699 (0.183)			-0.756 (0.765)	-0.219 (0.194)
Years of Education		0.0119* (0.00688)			0.0351* (0.0213)	0.0110 (0.00674)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.126 (0.155)			0.469 (0.449)	0.147 (0.146)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0955 (0.119)			0.473 (0.375)	0.148 (0.117)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.0275 (0.121)			0.137 (0.381)	0.0379 (0.106)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.0665 (0.0931)			0.232 (0.302)	0.0666 (0.0827)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.372** (0.163)			-1.141*** (0.436)	-0.357** (0.139)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		-0.0720 (0.0703)			-0.317 (0.216)	-0.0991 (0.0676)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		-0.00902 (0.0876)			0.0757 (0.284)	0.0237 (0.0889)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0185** (0.00815)			-0.0559* (0.0314)	-0.0175* (0.00984)
Constant	0.287*** (0.0469)	0.722*** (0.214)	-0.561*** (0.137)		1.119* (0.664)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.005	0.126				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 10. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (1 if Satisfied).

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	OLS	OLS	Probit	Marginal Effect	Probit	Marginal Effect
Treatment	-0.0601 (0.0631)	-0.0595 (0.0630)	-0.184 (0.194)	-0.0603 (0.0634)	-0.170 (0.208)	-0.0535 (0.0651)
Duration of trial (days)		3.68e-08 (6.34e-05)			-7.58e-06 (0.000158)	-2.38e-06 (4.97e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		0.127 (0.134)			0.445 (0.440)	0.126 (0.134)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0212 (0.132)			-0.0697 (0.413)	-0.0237 (0.139)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0189 (0.135)			-0.0822 (0.413)	-0.0280 (0.139)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0135 (0.162)			-0.0212 (0.495)	-0.00712 (0.166)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.0472 (0.170)			0.335 (0.619)	0.0993 (0.178)
Years of Education		0.00700 (0.00633)			0.0215 (0.0211)	0.00676 (0.00659)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.242 (0.160)			-0.765 (0.466)	-0.280 (0.172)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0221 (0.0998)			0.0667 (0.356)	0.0197 (0.105)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.0411 (0.108)			0.0994 (0.384)	0.0290 (0.112)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		-0.00179 (0.0910)			-0.0431 (0.308)	-0.0133 (0.0941)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.0494 (0.125)			-0.218 (0.414)	-0.0685 (0.130)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		-0.132** (0.0662)			-0.433* (0.232)	-0.136* (0.0719)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.179* (0.101)			0.584** (0.282)	0.183** (0.0881)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0149** (0.00737)			-0.0482** (0.0226)	-0.0151** (0.00705)
Constant	0.766*** (0.0439)	0.761*** (0.189)	0.726*** (0.143)		0.833 (0.591)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.005	0.111				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 11. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Change in satisfaction with judicial system in FATA (1 if improved).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) Marginal Effect	(5) Probit	(6) Marginal Effect
Treatment	0.113 (0.0686)	0.0939 (0.0711)	0.302 (0.185)	0.114 (0.0694)	0.276 (0.201)	0.0998 (0.0722)
Duration of trial (days)		-5.16e-05* (2.69e-05)			-0.000501 (0.000332)	-0.000181 (0.000118)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		0.141 (0.147)			0.338 (0.426)	0.127 (0.153)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		0.0791 (0.147)			0.171 (0.422)	0.0623 (0.150)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		-0.0598 (0.151)			-0.245 (0.447)	-0.0800 (0.151)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		0.0498 (0.175)			0.103 (0.500)	0.0369 (0.178)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		-0.186 (0.198)			-0.796 (0.781)	-0.210 (0.178)
Years of Education		-0.0163*** (0.00751)			-0.0455*** (0.0205)	-0.0165*** (0.00739)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.0375 (0.167)			0.193 (0.459)	0.0674 (0.165)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.112 (0.116)			0.406 (0.334)	0.148 (0.122)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		0.102 (0.134)			0.353 (0.355)	0.128 (0.130)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.0136 (0.0955)			0.0981 (0.277)	0.0335 (0.0938)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		-0.222 (0.179)			-0.609 (0.452)	-0.220 (0.164)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		-0.0398 (0.0765)			-0.158 (0.212)	-0.0574 (0.0767)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0243 (0.0928)			0.0955 (0.273)	0.0346 (0.0988)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0113 (0.00708)			-0.0349 (0.0231)	-0.0126 (0.00836)
Constant	0.309*** (0.0479)	0.641*** (0.229)	-0.500*** (0.136)		0.503 (0.636)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.014	0.107				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 12. Estimated OLS, Probit coefficients and Marginal Effects at means.

Dependent variable: Change in satisfaction with judicial system in FATA (1 if worsened).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) Marginal Effect	(5) Probit	(6) Marginal Effect
Treatment	-0.183*** (0.0601)	-0.173*** (0.0636)	-0.609*** (0.203)	-0.182*** (0.0602)	-0.593*** (0.228)	-0.168*** (0.0630)
Duration of trial (days)		4.72e-05* (2.77e-05)			0.000142 (0.000111)	4.02e-05 (3.12e-05)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		-0.181 (0.156)			-0.565 (0.443)	-0.164 (0.144)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		-0.159 (0.153)			-0.524 (0.436)	-0.155 (0.143)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		0.0835 (0.164)			0.311 (0.444)	0.116 (0.160)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		-0.236 (0.170)			-0.868 (0.584)	-0.222 (0.153)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		0.00223 (0.224)			0.123 (0.655)	0.0444 (0.239)
Years of Education		0.00620 (0.00537)			0.0245 (0.0203)	0.00694 (0.00576)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.132 (0.157)			0.405 (0.494)	0.134 (0.169)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		-0.00236 (0.119)			-0.00166 (0.375)	-0.000479 (0.108)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		-0.122 (0.0984)			-0.568 (0.383)	-0.125 (0.0878)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.00890 (0.0969)			0.0561 (0.325)	0.0165 (0.0948)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		0.203* (0.106)			0.821 (0.572)	0.232 (0.161)
Have you heard about FATA tribunal (1 if Yes)		0.00701 (0.0649)			0.00993 (0.233)	0.00281 (0.0659)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		-0.00335 (0.0819)			0.0279 (0.289)	0.00788 (0.0817)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.00297 (0.00617)			-0.0160 (0.0239)	-0.00453 (0.00680)
Constant	0.330*** (0.0487)	0.189 (0.182)	-0.441*** (0.134)		-1.135* (0.686)	
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.046	0.147				

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

Table 13. Estimated OLS, Multinomial Probit and Multinomial Logit coefficients.

Dependent variable: Change in satisfaction with judicial system in FATA (0 or No Change is the base).

VARIABLES	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) M. Probit (Improved)	(4) M. Probit (Worsened)	(5) M. Probit (Improved)	(6) M. Probit (Worsened)	(7) M. Logit (Improved)	(8) M. Logit (Worsened)	(9) M. Logit (Improved)	(10) M. Logit (Worsened)
Treatment	-0.252** (0.111)	-0.251** (0.118)	0.106 (0.269)	-0.731** (0.292)	0.0608 (0.288)	-0.721** (0.324)	0.136 (0.332)	-0.984** (0.390)	0.131 (0.361)	-1.016** (0.451)
Duration of trial (days)		4.28e-05 (6.30e-05)			-0.000563 (0.000421)	9.55e-05 (0.000150)			-0.000857 (0.000666)	0.000133 (0.000179)
Age - 26-35 (vs. 18-25)		-0.220 (0.263)			0.169 (0.598)	-0.601 (0.615)			0.291 (0.776)	-0.821 (0.834)
Age - 36-45 (vs. 18-25)		-0.238 (0.267)			-0.0517 (0.602)	-0.690 (0.616)			0.00156 (0.792)	-0.880 (0.825)
Age - 46-55 (vs. 18-25)		0.107 (0.275)			-0.197 (0.633)	0.323 (0.624)			-0.237 (0.832)	0.432 (0.825)
Age - 56-65 (vs. 18-25)		-0.422 (0.300)			-0.313 (0.698)	-1.218 (0.797)			-0.267 (0.891)	-1.670 (1.137)
Age - 66-75 (vs. 18-25)		-0.181 (0.394)			-1.128 (1.055)	-0.215 (0.900)			-1.479 (1.460)	-0.244 (1.122)
Years of Education		-0.00386 (0.0107)			-0.0570* (0.0298)	0.00425 (0.0297)			-0.0734** (0.0374)	0.00541 (0.0387)
Profession - Private employee (vs. Jobless)		0.301 (0.269)			0.588 (0.657)	0.714 (0.691)			0.582 (0.861)	1.062 (0.959)
Profession - Government employee (vs. Jobless)		0.107 (0.218)			0.630 (0.493)	0.242 (0.545)			0.739 (0.618)	0.358 (0.733)
Profession - Agriculture (vs. Jobless)		-0.143 (0.194)			0.296 (0.507)	-0.654 (0.536)			0.326 (0.636)	-0.732 (0.736)
Profession - Self-employed (vs. Jobless)		0.0314 (0.179)			0.167 (0.400)	0.106 (0.453)			0.158 (0.496)	0.170 (0.620)
Own a home (1 if Yes)		0.184 (0.235)			-0.534 (0.669)	0.799 (0.797)			-0.693 (0.889)	1.075 (1.250)
Have you heard about FATA		-0.0258			-0.241	-0.0855			-0.289	-0.140

FATA Tribunal Evaluation Report

tribunal (1 if Yes)		(0.122)			(0.308)	(0.334)			(0.388)	(0.465)
Is it a civil or a criminal case? (1 if Civil)		0.0176			0.139	0.0914			0.146	0.0771
		(0.166)			(0.400)	(0.420)			(0.502)	(0.558)
How long should a case take (months)		-0.0172			-0.0586*	-0.0445			-0.0683*	-0.0484
		(0.0123)			(0.0326)	(0.0335)			(0.0401)	(0.0440)
Constant	0.968**									
	*	1.018***	-0.125	-0.0734	1.125	-0.397	-0.159	-0.0924	1.428	-0.581
	(0.0861)	(0.357)	(0.200)	(0.198)	(0.935)	(0.992)	(0.253)	(0.249)	(1.217)	(1.406)
Observations	196	190	196	196	190	190	196	196	190	190
R-squared	0.026	0.101								

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *indicates significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent significance level; and *** at the 1 percent significance level.

FATA Tribunal survey



Disclaimer

This questionnaire is a part of a Survey that the Government has sponsored and is conducted by University of Peshawar. The purpose of this survey is to find the trust level that people have on the Government. The questionnaire includes few questions mainly focusing on the Political Issues of FATA, trust level that people have on different Government Institutions and the different ways these institutions offer services to the populace. All the questions asked and data collected respectively is purely used for the research and academic purposes. Your responses and participation will be limited only to statistics for the research and will not identify you as an individual in any part of the study. Your participation to fill this questionnaire though remains completely voluntary and consequently, your responses and answers will form an important part of statistical study in a phase of the research study.

Thank you for your cooperation.

FATA Tribunal survey

Q1a	Name of litigant											
Q1b	Age	18-25	26-35	36-45	46-55	56-65	65-75	Over 75				
Q2	Gender	Male					Female					
Q3	Marital status	Single/ Unmarried					Married			Widowed		
Q4a	Number of Dependents											
Q4b	Number of children living with you	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	Any other			
Q5	Education	None	Primary	Middle	SSC	FA/FSc	BA/BSc	MA or higher	Professional degree (MBBS etc.)		Darse Nizami	
Q6	Profession	Private Employee		Gov't Employee		Agriculture		Self Employed		Housewife	Jobless	
Q7a	With which ethnic group you identify yourself:	Pashtun	Hindko speaking		Chitrali	Gujjar	Hazara		Punjabi	Other		
Q7b	What type of vehicle do you own?	Car	Motorcycle	Bicycle	Another Motorized vehicle			Do not own a vehicle				
Q7c	Do you own your home?	Yes					No					
Q7d	How much land do you own?	In Acres/ Marlas/ Jareebis										
Q8a	Date of Institution						Q8b	Date of Decision:				
Q9a	Agency/ FR:	Q9b			Tehsil:			Q9c		Village:		

Q10a	Have you heard about FATA Tribunal	Yes				No			
Q10b	If yes, how did you come to know about FATA Tribunal	Newspaper	TV	Radio	Lawyer	Someone			
Q10c	Have you ever been a litigant in the FATA legal system?	Yes				No			
Q10d	If, yes when was the first litigation started?	Year:							
Q10e	How many cases with FATA Tribunal								
Q10f	How many cases, past and present, in the FATA legal system								
Q10g	When did your current litigation start in the lowest court	Year:							
Q10h	When did your current litigation start in the current court								
Q10i	Which court has your case?	APA		PA	Commissioner		Tribunal		
Q10j	Is it a civil or a criminal case?	Civil			Criminal				
Q10k	Are you the party who has brought the case?	Yes			No, the case is against me				
Q10l	If you are in appeal or revision, was the case in lower case decided in	Yes				No			

FATA Tribunal survey

	your favor?					
Now a few questions regarding your current litigation in the current court and what has been your experience? Satisfaction Scale (Min 1- 5 Max)						
Q11a	The record was available in time for your case proceedings					
Q11b	The witness(es) appeared in time and there were no delays because of it					
Q11c	I was made aware of what was going on during the proceedings at every stage					
Q11d	Received complete information about my rights as litigant					
Q11e	Satisfied with the court proceedings					
Q11f	Satisfied with the time in which my case was decided in the APA court (if decided)					
Q11g	Satisfied with the time in which appeal/revision decided					
Q11h	Satisfied with judgment, if received					
Q11i	Will this affect your life positively					
Q11j	Cost of Litigation is high					
Q11k	Satisfied with the legal process					
Q11l	The adjournments given for your case hearings were not too far apart					
Q11m	Satisfied with dates of hearing communicated to you in timely manner					
Q11n	Satisfied with Coordination/communication between you and your counsel					
Q11o	Judgment and interim orders including adjournment order are read to me					
Q11p	Judgment orders (that apply to this case) was understood by you					
Q11q	Satisfied by the Judicial System in FATA					
Q11r	Are you satisfied with the trial courts of APAs in FATA					
Q11s	Have your views about the legal system in FATA changed in the last 03 months?			Yes		No
Which of the following aspects of proceedings in court are you satisfied with: Satisfaction Scale (Min 1- 5 Max)						
Q11t	Adjournments and length of time between them given by the court					
Q11u	Lawyers' help with me					
Q11v	Court proceedings					
Q11w	Process service (sending notices to other party or to me)					
Q11x	Getting copies of orders and/or judgment					
Q11y	Will you get justice from the legal system					

FATA Tribunal survey

I am now going to ask you a series of questions about yourself and your family.											
41.	How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?	Dissatisfied									Satisfied
42.	All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?										
43.	How interested would you say you are in politics?	Not Interested									Very Interested
44.	How proud are you to be a Pakistani?	Not at all									Very Proud
45.	How much violence have you or a member of your family witnessed over the past year?	Haven't witnessed any violence									Witnessed extreme amount of violence
46.	How often have you or members of your family heard artillery shells, drone strikes, or other violent explosions over the past year?	Heard them often									Never Heard them
We are now going to ask you some questions about your attitudes towards others.											
47.	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?	a) Most people can be trusted.				b) Can't be too careful.					
48.	Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?	a) Would take advantage of you.				b) Would try to be fair					
49.	Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?	a) Try to be helpful.				b) Looking out for themselves.					
We are now going to read you a series of statements. We would like to know to what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?											
50.	I like to help others	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree					
51.	I trust others										
52.	When dealing with strangers, one is better off using caution before trusting them										
We are now going to read a series of statements about actions that you may or may not engage in. We would like to know the frequency with which you do each.											
53.	How often have you benefited from the generosity of a person you did not know?	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	V. Often					
54.	How often do you leave your house or car door unlocked?										
55.	How often do you lend personal possessions other than money to others?										

FATA Tribunal survey

56. Taking all things together, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	Highly Unsatisfied				Highly Satisfied
57. Overall, how satisfied are you with your life at home these days?					
58. Overall, how satisfied are you with your present job these days?					
59. Overall, how satisfied are you with your present health?					
60. Overall, how satisfied are you with the community in which you live these days?					

61. Have you ever used Internet or Mobile to access any service offered by government? Yes (If yes, go to question 63)
No (If no, go to question 62)

62. Why you have not used these Internet or Mobile Services?

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. I'm illiterate ii. I'm shy/afraid to use these services iii. I don't know about these services iv. I don't have Internet or Mobile to use these services v. I don't know how to use these services online or on mobile | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> vi. These services are too complicated vii. There services are in English which is difficult viii. I tried but the mobile services/ website had too many problems ix. These services are a Ridicules |
|---|---|

63. Where did you get to know about the above services (Tick the One that applies):

- i. Radio
- ii. Television
- iii. Newspaper
- iv. Government Official
- v. NGOs
- vi. Hujra
- vii. Friend or Family
- viii. Any other (Please Specify)