Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0

Author-Name: Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez
Author-Email: rponce@uacj.mx  
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez
Author-Workplace-Homepage: http://www.uacj.mx

Author-Name: Charles R. Hankla
Author-Email:chankla@gsu.edu 
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Political Science, Georgia State University 
Author-Workplace-Homepage:http://www.gsu.edu/ 

Author-Name: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Author-Email:jorgemartinez@gsu.edu  
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 
Author-Workplace-Homepage:http://www.gsu.edu/ 

Author-Name: Eunice Heredia-Ortiz
Author-Email:  
Author-Workplace-Name: Development Alternatives Inc., DAI 
Author-Workplace-Homepage:https://www.dai.com/

Title: The Provision of Local Public Goods in Proportional Representation Electoral Systems with Closed and Open Party Lists.

Abstract: In this paper we find that the institutional set up of proportional representation systems matters for the welfare properties related with the ideal structure of government providing local public goods. In particular, we study the role of party centralization vs party decentralization in the provision of local public goods. In this paper, we show that the provision of local public goods with inter-regional spillovers by a system of local governments (welfare) dominates the fiscally centralized provision in economies with a proportional representation electoral system and closed party lists. We call this outcome the strong decentralization theorem. For this type of economies, the conventional decentralization theorem (originally identified by Oates 1972) is also satisfied. For economies with a proportional representation and open party lists systems the strong decentralization theorem is satisfied only when party centralization (i.e., the ability of party leaders to nominate candidates in the party’s lists) plays a dominant role in determining the policy platforms of candidates. However, if there is party decentralization (parties lack the ability to influence policy through the nomination process in the party’s list) the strong decentralization theorem is not satisfied. Lastly, the conventional decentralization theorem is satisfied in economies with proportional representation electoral systems and open party lists in both type of party systems: centralized and decentralized.
Length: 52 pages

Creation-Date: 2017-06

File-URL: https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2021/07/paper1714.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf

Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1714