Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Xipeng Gao Author-Workplace-Name: School of Economics and Finance, XiÕan Jiaotong University, XiÕan, Shaanxi, PR China Author-Workplace-Email: frankgao96@stu.xjtu.edu.cn Author-Name: Xiangju Li Author-Workplace-Name: School of Economics and Finance, XiÕan Jiaotong University, XiÕan, Shaanxi, PR China Author-Name: Jorge Martinez-Vazquez Author-Workplace-Name: International Center for Public Policy, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia, United States Author-Workplace-Email: jorgemartinez@gsu.edu Title: Green Taxes and Fees Competition and Productivity Growth: Evidence from China Abstract: A central tenet in the fiscal federalism literature posits that inter-jurisdictional tax competition can engender economic efficiency losses. However, diverse firms exhibit heterogeneous sensitivities to varying tax burdens. When firms strategically evaluate differential tax pressures across tax categories, tax competition evolves into competition over tax structure. This dynamic is particularly pronounced in the case of green taxes and fees, which aim to internalize negative externalities compared to conventional tax instruments. We identify a Òrace to the bottomÓ phenomenon in corporate green taxes and fees driven by structural distortions within the tax system in China. Based on the constructed theoretical model of energy factor allocation that includes a distortionary coefficient of green taxes and fees, we predict that the efficiency growth of firms will decrease as the intensity of their Òrace to the bottomÓ competition increases in response to the relative pressure of green taxes and fees. Using data from listed companies in China, we find a robust negative relation between the Òrace to the bottomÓ competitive intensity of green taxes and fees pressure and total factor productivity growth. Our findings indicate that increasing the intensity of fiscal and environmental decentralization exacerbates the problem of the intensity of competition in the corporate tax structure, generating significant efficiency losses. These findings provide new evidence on the economic disadvantages of unchecked tax competition in decentralized systems. Length: 40 pages Creation-Date: 2025-04 File-URL: https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2025/04/paper2507.pdf File-Format: application/pdf Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2507