Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0


Author-Name: Ignacio Lago
Author-Workplace-Name: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Barcelona, Spain
Author-Workplace-Email: ignacio.lago@upf.edu

Author-Name: Andre Blais
Author-Workplace-Name: Universite de Montreal, Departement de science politique, Canada
Author-Workplace-Email: andre.blais@umontreal.ca

Title: The Politics of Public Goods Provision Under Asymmetric Decentralization

Abstract: This paper examines how asymmetric regional decentralization affects the politics of public goods provision. While global decentralization has increased since World War II, the political consequences of growing asymmetry in the distribution of authority across regions within states remain understudied. Using survey data from Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Spain, as well as panel data from 709 legislative elections in 73 democracies (1960-2018), the study explores how centralized, symmetric, and asymmetric territorial arrangements influence electoral accountability and party nationalization. We show that asymmetric decentralization decreases electoral accountability in national elections but increases it in regional elections. Moreover, it contributes to greater territorial heterogeneity in partisan support within countries.

Length: 24 pages

Creation-Date: 2026-01

File-URL: https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2026/01/paper2602.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf

Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2602