Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0


Author-Name: Alberto Chong 
Author-Workplace-Name: Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University and Department of Economics, Universidad del Pacifico, Peru

Title: Political Institutions Without Property-Rights Deterioration: Evidence from Coup Attempts, 1950-2024

Abstract: A large literature treats political and economic institutions as jointly determined, implying that a shock that removes constraints on the executive should weaken both. I test this transmission hypothesis using data for 95 countries from 1950 to 2024. Using complementary causal quasi-experimental designs, I find that coups sharply deteriorate political, legal, and administrative institutions and increase corruption. Against these large responses, however, property rights change little. This is not evidence of inertness: the same property-rights index rises by 0.45 standard deviations following a democratic transition. Coups also move property rights within countries, increasing absolute deviations from pre-coup levels without a common direction. The evidence therefore points to asymmetric institutional adjustment: political constraints can collapse sharply while broad measured property-rights protection remains comparatively persistent.

Length: 29 pages

Creation-Date: 2026-10

File-URL: http://ayspsrd.gsu.edu/ays/ispwps/paper2632.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf

Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2632